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DISKUSSION
H e r m e n e u t i c s o f Experimental Science in the Context of the Life-World*
PATRICK

A. H E E L A N

I distinguished science as an element of our total contemporary culture,
"historical science", from science as the professional business of natural scientists ,"experimental science". Phenomenology has always taken a very critical
stance against certain defects or biasses -- objectivism, scientism, techicism -- it
has found in historical science. It is my purpose to show that these defects and
biasses, associated historically with physical science, are not necessary parts of
physical science, and consequently, that physics, especially experimental
physics, has all of those hermeneutical, ontological, historical and dialectical
dimensions negated by historical science. The notion of dialectic is given a
formal logical construction as a time-dependent Q-lattice (Quantum-lattice or
Quantum-logic), the form of which is suggested b y quantum mechanics. The
following positions are then proposed and defended: (1) Scientific states of
affairs are given in an originary way to the experiencing scientist during the
course of scientific observation. (2) Scientific observation involves a special
non-objective use of the instrument; one in which the noetic intention is
embodied in the instrument joined, physically and intentionally, with the
scientist; this non-objective use is characterized by a hermeneutical shift in the
subject--object cut so as to place the instrument on the subject side of the cut,
and the instrumental signals in a position of a " t e x t " to be "read" in a "context." (3) Scientific experimentation in the fullest sense involves the possibility
of a human subject embodying himself in instrumentation not only for the
purposes of observation, but also to create that context, physical and noetic,
which is the condition of possibility for the scientific object to manifest itself
in observation. (4) The historical fact of scientific revolutions confirms the
hermeneutical aspect of experimental science and adds a dialectical movement
to its history. (5) In consequence of what has been said, we can outline the
moments in the genetic constitution of scientific objects as elements of the
lifeworld of the scientist; the scientist first learns the objective use of instrumentation, then, through acquired expertise, he passes to a non-objective use
of instrumentation characterized by the following: intentional or subjective
* Der hier abgedruckte Text ist der letzte Abschnitt der unter o.a. Titel in der Zeitschrift Philosophia Mathematica 9(1972), S. 101--144, erschienenen Untersuchung des
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embodiment in instrumental artifacts, a hermeneutical shift in the subjectobject cut, and the assimilation of instrumental signals to a text. (6) Technological artifacts make possible modes of observational givenness which, unlike
experimental science, are constituted by human technical interests; within this
context scientific terms are used with analogical meanings. (7) Quantum
mechanics as a physical science gives a logical model, the Q-lattice, for the
relation between context-dependent and dialectically related languages, that
is, languages supposing relatively non-compossible modes of subjectitiy. (8)
Quantum mechanics cannot be understood without recourse to a transcendental
language that is the dialectical synthesis, in a Q-lattice, of physics and psychology. (9) The hermeneutic aspects of natural scince and technology have
momentous consequences for the evolution of human subjectivity and the lifeworld.
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Commentary on Patrick Heelan's "Hermeneutics of Experimental Science
in the Context of the Life-World"
THEODORE

KISIEL

The topic for this session, when isolated and typed, is in fact a rare
species of a rather common genus, namely, the phenomenology of natural
science. Moreover, the paper before us identifies an even rarer subspecies,
the hermeneutics of natural science, which in most quarters would
certainly be viewed as a monstrous hybrid. For ever since the days of
Schleiermacher and Dilthey, hermeneutics has become the method
distinct to the human sciences and distinguished sharply from the method
employed by the natural sciences.
It is in fact surprising how this species of phenomenology even today
is seldom pursued. Aside from Professor Heelan's unique and most
welcome contributions in this direction, one might recall Joseph Kockelman's work along Heideggerian lines and look forward to the forthcoming
book promised by Aron Gurwitsch in the tradition of Husserl. And yet,
in view of the latest developments-in the philosophy of science, it seems
that the time is ripe for phenomenologists to take advantage of decades
of incubation and programmatic maneuvering by applying the categories
thus developed to some of the issues raised by the new philosophy of
science.
After a promising start by Hermann Weyl, Oskar Becker, Hedwig
Conrad-Martins, Moritz Geiger and others, the application of phenomenological categories to the more specific philosophical issues of natural
science lapsed into a state of neglect by the second generation of phenomenologists. Aside from contingent historical factors, one major reason

